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CELLPHONE SEARCHES: WORKS LIKE A
COMPUTER, PROTECTED LIKE A PAGER?
Byron Kish+
When a person cannot know how a court will apply a settled
principle to a recurring factual situation, that person cannot know the
scope of his constitutional protection, nor can a policeman know the
scope of his authority.'
Rapidly evolving technology threatens to stretch forty years of jurisprudence
defining the limits of searches incident to lawful arrests beyond the scope
2Supreme Court holdings have contemplated. Attempts by state and federal
courts to fit the products of technological breakthroughs into particular
classifications of property for the purposes of determining Fourth Amendment
protections have yielded inconsistent case law that has, at times, made
sensitive information vulnerable to exposure.
It is well established that a police officer may, incident to a lawful arrest,
contemporaneously search an arrestee and the area within the arrestee's
immediate control without first obtaining a warrant.4 However, the Supreme
Court has distinguished between items that are elements of the person5 and that
are possessions within the arrestee's immediate control to determine the
permissible scope of the search. At the scene of the arrest, it is reasonable for
a police officer to search an item considered an element of the person and a
+ J.D., 2010, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law; B.S.B.A., 2007,
Central Michigan University. The author thanks Professor Mary Leary for her invaluable time,
expertise, and guidance. The author also extends a special thanks to his friends and family for
their constant support, love, and humor; especially, his wife Paula for all the little things she does
to brighten the day and her unending patience on the long nights.
1. New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 459-60 (1981), abrogated by Arizona v. Gant, 129
S. Ct. 1710 (2009).
2. See infra Part I.B-C.
3. See infra Part I.C.
4. See United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 60-61 (1950) (discussing the history of
searches incident to arrest), abrogated by Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
5. See United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800, 805 (1974) (finding that subjecting the
respondent's clothing to laboratory analysis was justified as a search incident to arrest).
6. See United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1977) (finding that a footlocker
within police control was not within the immediate control of the arrestee), abrogated by
California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (1991).
445
Catholic University Law Review
possession within a person's immediate control.7  However, different
principles apply for determining the reasonableness of a search later at the
police station.8
Until recently, courts have interpreted this distinction with relative
uniformity.9  Purses, luggage, and computers are generally considered
possessions within the arrestee's immediate control and cannot be searched
without a warrant once they are in the exclusive control of the police. o
Wallets, address books, and pagers are generally considered elements of the
person and may be searched without a warrant within a reasonable time after
the arrest." Cellphones, however, do not fit neatly into either category,
launching a debate among courts as to the proper way to classify them for
purposes of the Fourth Amendment.12 On the one hand, cellphones are small
and can easily be carried in a pants pocket, coat, or on the belt.' 3 On the other
hand, there may be a large amount of information contained in a cellphone
similar to that found in brief cases and computers.14 Currently, eighty-seven
percent of U.S. residents own a cellphone.' 5  With increasingly more
Americans using cellphones, the need for a uniform standard is great.
7. See id; Edwards, 415 U.S. at 805.
8. See Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 15.
9. See infra text accompanying notes 87-91.
10. See infra Part I.B.2.b.
I1. See infra Part I.B.2.a.
12. See infra Part I.C.
13. The trend seems to be for cellphones to keep getting smaller. See Gadgets Getting
Smaller: Electrical Engineers envision Broad, Transformational Use of Flash Memory, SCI.
DAILY (Mar. 1, 2006), http://www.sciencedaily.com/videos/2006/0309-gadgetsgetting_smaller.
htm.
14. See United States v. Park, No. CR 05-375SI, 2007 WL 1521573, at *8 (N.D. Cal. May
23, 2007) (noting that a cellphone has "the capacity for storing immense amounts of private
information"). Cellphones may have Bluetooth capabilities, removable memories, cameras,
music players, family locators, text messaging, email, web, and global positioning system (GPS)
navigation. See List of Smartphones for Sale, SPRINT, http://www.sprint.com/
index c.html (follow "Phones" hyperlink under the "Shop" tab) (last visited Nov. 19, 2010)
[hereinafter SPRINT]; Select a Phone or Device, VERIZON WIRELESS, http://www.verizon
wireless.com (follow "Smartphones" hyperlink under the "Phones & Devices" tab) (last visited
Nov. 19, 2010) [hereinafter VERIZON WIRELESS]. Furthermore, sixty-one percent of"Generation
Y" wants an increasing number of features on cellphones. See New Study Shows Mobile Phones
Merging New, Established Roles: Communicator, Shopping Aide, Entertainment and Research
Hub, KNOWLEDGE NETWORKS, http://www.knowledgenetworks.com/news/releases/2008/0 9
1808_mobilephones.html (last visited Nov. 19, 2010) [hereinafter New Study].
15. 6/12: Cellphone Nation, MARIST POLL (June 12, 2009), http://maristpoll.
marist.edu/612-cell-phone-nation/. Indeed, sixty percent of Americans say they have their
cellphones on them at all times. New Study, supra note 14. Sixteen percent of cellphone users
carry a smartphone-also known as a personal digital assistant (PDA}-such as a Blackberry or
iPhone. 6/12: PDA 's: Luxury or Necessity?, MARIST POLL (June 12, 2009), http://maristpoll.
marist.edu/612-pdas-luxury-or-necessity/. This percentage climbs if the consumer is a male
(twenty percent), under forty-five years old (twenty-six percent), eams more than $50,000 (thirty-
one percent), or lives in the West (twenty three percent). Table: Own a PDA?,
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This Comment discusses whether a cellphone should be classified as a
possession within an arrestee's control or as an element of the person for
purposes of searches incident to lawful arrest. It begins by discussing how the
Supreme Court fashioned the exception to the Fourth Amendment search-
warrant requirement and the dual rationales underlying its inception. Next, this
Comment examines the distinction the Court draws between possessions
within an arrestee's control and those found on the arrestee's person. It
continues by considering state and federal cases that have defined what items
are intrinsically associated with the person. This Comment then discusses how
courts have struggled to classify cellphones, resulting in inconsistent holdings
regarding the class of items in which cellphones best fit. It then considers the
various arguments for classifying a cellphone as either a possession within an
arrestee's control or as an element of the person.
This Comment demonstrates that cellphones are better categorized as
possessions within an arrestee's immediate control than as elements of an
arrestee's person. Then, it addresses the arguments in support of a new Fourth
Amendment rule specifically for cellphones. This Comment ultimately
concludes that cellphones are a possession in the arrestee's immediate control
subject to the warrant requirement once they are within the exclusive control of
the police. This approach best comports with the Supreme Court's current
jurisprudence and adequately protects privacy interests in a world of emerging
technology.
1. THWARTED BY TECHNOLOGY: THE SUPREME COURT'S STRUGGLE TO
MAINTAIN BRIGHT-LINE RULES DEFINING THE SCOPE OF SEARCHES INCIDENT
To ARREST
The Fourth Amendment protects people against unreasonable governmental
searches of their "persons, houses, papers, and effects.", 6  Pursuant to this
protection, there is a strong preference for law-enforcement officers to obtain a
search warrant before searching a container belonging to a person.17  This
general rule is subject to a few exceptions, including the "search incident to
arrest" doctrine.1 However, the Supreme Court has not applied this exception
uniformly,' 9 which has led lower courts to attempt to determine whether a
MARIST POLL, http://maristpoll.marist.edu/wp-content/misc/us090309/Technology/Have%20
PDA.htm (last visited Nov. 15, 2010). Seventy-one percent of teenagers owned a cellphone in
early 2008. Amanda Lenhart, Teens and Mobile Phones over the Past Five Years: Pew Internet
Looks Back, PEW INTERNET (Aug. 19, 2009), http://www.pewinternet.org/Reports/2009/14--
Teens-and-Mobile-Phones-Data-Memo.aspx.
16. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see also Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967)
(stating that the Fourth Amendment protects "people" and not "places").
17. Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 1716 (2009).
18. Id.
19. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 760 n.4 (1969).
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container may be searched by the police after an arrest.20  If the court
determines that the container is an element of the arrestee's person, then the
police may search the container within any reasonable time after the container
is within their exclusive control.21 Alternatively, if the court determines that
the container is a possession within the arrestee's immediate control, then the
police may not search the container once it comes under their exclusive
control.22
A. Emerging Exceptions to the Fourth Amendment Warrant Requirement
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall
not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable
cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.23
The scope of the Fourth Amendment protection from unreasonable searches
is constantly evolving.24 In Katz v. United States, the Supreme Court clarified
for the first time that "the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places." 25
The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) investigated Katz for violating
federal law by making wagers over the telephone. 26 The FBI listened to Katz's
conversations by placing an electronic-listening device on the outside of the
20. Compare United States v. Monclavo-Cruz, 662 F.2d 1285, 1289-90 (9th Cir. 1981)
(concluding that a purse on an arrestee's lap was not an article of clothing and thus could not have
been searched incident to arrest later at the police station), with United States v. Passaro, 624 F.2d
938, 943-44 (9th Cir. 1980) (characterizing a wallet as an element of the arrestee's person subject
to search incident to arrest later at the initial place of detention).
21. See United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800, 808-09 (1974) ("[T]he legal arrest of a
person ... does-for at least a reasonable time and to a reasonable extent-take his own privacy
out of the realm of protection from police interest in weapons, means of escape, and evidence."
(quoting United States v. DeLeo, 422 F.2d 487, 493 (1st Cir. 1970))).
22. See United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 15 (1977).
23. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
24. See Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 1718-19 (2009) (rejecting the state's argument
that, based on precedent, a police officer is justified in searching a vehicle incident to arrest
regardless of whether officer safety or preservation of evidence is implicated); United States v.
Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973) (holding that a police officer may search both an arrestee and
containers found on an arrestee as a search incident to arrest, regardless of the probability of
finding evidence of the crime or instruments affecting officer safety); Chimel, 395 U.S. at 762-63
(holding that a search incident to arrest is an exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant
requirement, provided that the search is confined in scope based on officer safety or preservation
of evidence); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351, 353, 358-59 (1967) (observing that the
"Fourth Amendment protects people, not places," and therefore the surveillance of a conversation
within a telephone booth requires a warrant regardless of whether there was a physical intrusion);
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928) (requiring physical intrusion as a
prerequisite to Fourth Amendment protection), overruled by Katz, 389 U.S. 347.
25. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351.
26. Id. at 348.
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27
telephone booth that he used to make his bets. In support of its argument that
the search did not violate the Fourth Amendment, the government emphasized
that it had not physically invaded the booth.28  The Court rejected this
argument and stated that the government's activities "violated the privacy upon
which [Katz] justifiably relied while using the telephone booth."29
Justice John Marshall Harlan's concurrence further extrapolated on the
Court's statement that the "Fourth Amendment protects people, not places."3 o
Specifically, Justice Harlan explained that Katz had "a constitutionally
protected reasonable expectation of privacy" in the telephone booth.31 He
synthesized this holding into a two-element test to determine whether a search
had occurred: "first that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective)
expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society is
prepared to recognize as 'reasonable."' 32 Today, this test is the standard rubric
under which courts determine whether a Fourth Amendment search has
occurred.33
Although the Court announced that a warrantless search is almost always
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment, the Katz Court also acknowledged
that the general warrant requirement is subject to "a few specifically
established and well-delineated exceptions." 34 Among these exceptions is a
search incident to arrest.35
27. Id.
28. Id. at 352.
29. Id. at 353. The Court's holding abandoned use of the trespass standard to determine
whether a search occurred. Id The Court also announced a strong preference for searches
conducted after an independent magistrate issues a search warrant: "[Slearches conducted outside
the judicial process . . . are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment-subject only to a
few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions." Id. at 357 (footnote omitted).
30. Id. at 351.
31. Id. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring).
32. Id at 361.
33. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742-43 (1979) (holding that because Smith likely
had no actual expectation of privacy, nor was it one that society was willing to accept as
reasonable, the use of a pen register by police to record the phone numbers dialed from Smith's
home was not a "search"); United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 752 (1971) (plurality opinion)
(noting that a person has no reasonable expectation of privacy in information voluntarily
conveyed to a third party).
34. Katz, 389 U.S. at 357.
35. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 224 (1973).
2011] 449
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B. The Supreme Court Attempts to Define the Search Incident to Arrest
Doctrine
Since its recognition by the Supreme Court in 1914, the scope of the search
incident to arrest exception has been difficult to determine and has been
clarified numerous times in the past ninety-seven years.37  At first, the
exception excluded only the search of the arrestee's person from the general
warrant requirement. However, in Carroll v. United States, the Court
expanded the scope of the government's warrantless-search authority to
include the area in the arrestee's control.39  In Marron v. United States, the
Court further expanded the area in which the police could search incident to
arrest to include "all parts of the [arrestee's] premises used for the unlawful
purpose."40
Under this expanded standard, courts struggled to define and limit the
permissible scope of a warrantless search under various circumstances for the
next twenty-three years.4 ' In United States v. Rabinowitz, the Court narrowed
the broad scope of searches permitted under Marron to the area within the
possession or control of the person arrested.4 2 In 1969, the Court clarified the
phrase "possession or control" in Chimel v. California.43
36. See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1914); see also James J. Tomkovicz,
Divining and Designing the Future of the Search Incident to Arrest Doctrine: Avoiding
Instability, Irrationality, and Infidelity, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 1417, 1419, 1422-23 (2007) (stating
that Weeks was the Court's first mention of the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine).
37. See supra Part I.A-B; see also New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 458 (1981)
("Although the principle that limits a search incident to a lawful custodial arrest may be stated
clearly enough, courts have discovered the principle difficult to apply in specific cases."),
abrogated by Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710 (2009).
38. See Weeks, 232 U.S. at 392 (recognizing the government's right "to search the person of
the accused when legally arrested, to discover and seize the fruits or evidences of crime").
39. See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 158 (1925) ("When a man is legally arrested
for an offense, whatever is found upon his person or in his control which it is unlawful for him to
have and which may be used to prove the offense may be seized and held as evidence in the
prosecution.").
40. Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 199 (1927).
41. See, e.g., United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 66 (1950) (stating that the test "is
not whether it is reasonable to procure a search warrant, but whether the search was reasonable"),
overruled by Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969); Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699,
705-06 (1948) (holding that, although the arrest was valid, the subsequent contemporaneous
seizure was not because the police had no justification for failing to obtain a search warrant),
overruled by Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56; Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 149, 153-55 (1947)
(upholding the warrantless search of Harris's entire apartment and the subsequent search of a
sealed envelope marked "George Harris, personal papers" found inside a desk), overruled by
Chimel, 395 U.S. 752; Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344, 358 (1931)
(distinguishing the facts of the present case from those in Marron because the search was related
to the execution of a search warrant, not a lawful arrest).
42. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. at 62-64.
43. Chimel, 395 U.S. at 763.
[Vol. 60:445450
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1. Varying Interpretations of the Scope of a Search Incident to Arrest
a. Immediate Control
In Chimel v. California, the Supreme Court considered "whether the
warrantless search of . .. [Chimel's] entire house [could] be constitutionally
justified as incident to [his)j arrest."" After the Court acknowledged the
unsettled scope of this rule, it found that the scope of a search incident to
arrest "must be strictly tied to and justified by the circumstances which
rendered its initiation permissible."46 The Court identified two justifications
underlying the search-incident-to-arrest exception: officer safety and
preservation of evidence. 47 As such, the Court limited the permissible scope of
a search incident to arrest to "the area from within which [the arrestee] might
gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence." The Court held that
the search of Chimel's entire three-bedroom home, including his garage and
attic, went beyond the area within Chimel's immediate control, and therefore
could not be justified by the search-incident-to-arrest exception. 49
b. Contemporaneous Search
In Preston v. United States, the Court noted that a search incident to arrest
must be made contemporaneously with that arrest.50 Subsequently, the Court
created a bright-line rule to define temporal and spatial limits for when a
search for evidence occurs contemporaneously with an arrest.
In United States v. Edwards, the Court considered whether a search of an
arrestee's clothing ten hours after his arrest was contemporaneous with his
arrest.51  Police arrested Edwards on charges of breaking and entering, took
him to jail, and placed him in a cell.52 Contemporaneous with this arrest,
44. Id. at 755. The police waited for Chimel inside his home with his wife's consent. Id. at
753. When Chimel arrived, the police placed him under arrest in accordance with an arrest
warrant. Id. Against his wishes and without a search warrant, the police searched Chimel's entire
three-bedroom house and seized several items over period of forty-five to sixty minutes. Id. at
753-54.
45. Id at 756-62.
46. Id. at 762 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
47. Id. at 763.
48. Id As a practical matter, the Court stated that these two justifications for a search
incident to arrest do not "routinely" justify searching rooms other than the one in which the
person is arrested, and do not cover searches "through all the desk drawers or other closed or
concealed areas in that room itself." Id. Put another way, these areas are not within an arrestee's
"immediate control." Id.
49. Id at 768.
50. Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 367 (1964) (holding that a search incident to
arrest is not reasonable if it "is remote in time or place from the arrest"), abrogated by Arizona v.
Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710 (2009).
51. United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800, 801 (1974).
52. Id
2011] 451
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police discovered that Edwards's clothing may have contained evidence of the
crime; however, because it was late at night, the police could not procure
substitute clothing and were unwilling to leave Edwards nude overnight.5 ' The
next morning, the police purchased substitute clothing and took Edwards's
clothing for analysis.54 The Court began with a broad statement that it is "plain
that searches and seizures that could be made on the spot at the time of arrest
may legally be conducted later when the accused arrives at the place of
detention." It reasoned that requiring the police to have immediately stripped
and searched Edwards's clothing and to have left him nude in his cell
56throughout the night was unreasonable. Thus, the Court held that searches of
clothing and possessions first seized upon arrival of the arrestee at the
jailhouse may be held and searched at a later time.57  However, the Court
cautioned:
we do not conclude that the Warrant Clause . . . is never applicable to
postarrest [sic] seizures of the effects of an arrestee. But we do think
that . . . "[w]hile the legal arrest of a person should not destroy the
privacy of his premises, it does-for at least a reasonable time and to
53. Id. at 801-02.
54. Id at 802.
55. Id at 803. The Court previously stated, in upholding a search of belongings taken to jail
by the arrestee, that it does not perceive a difference,
when the accused decides to take the property with him, for the search of it to occur
instead at the first place of detention when the accused arrives there, especially as the
search of property carried by an accused to the place of detention has additional
justifications, similar to those which justify a search of the person of one who is
arrested.
Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 239 (1960) (emphasis added).
The Court based its reasoning, in part, on twenty circuit court cases. Id. at 803 n.4. Eighteen
of the cases involved arrestees who were searched only after they arrived at the jailhouse; many
of these cases involved searching the arrestee's clothing, which required providing the arrestee
with substitute clothing and thus, seemingly do not stand for a broad reading of Edwards. See id
at 803-08. The other two cases arguably support a broader reading of Edwards. In Evalt v.
United States, a federal officer searched the arrestee's packsack upon arrest; after discovering
what he believed was stolen money, the officer took the packsack into custody and later searched
the money in the packsack for the serial numbers. Evalt v. United States, 382 F.2d 424, 427 (9th
Cir. 1967). In Malone v. Crouse, the arrestee's suitcase was seized during arrest and was not
searched until later; the court held that the search was lawful because it was contemporaneous
with the arrest and did not occur at "another place" as prohibited by Preston. Malone v. Crouse,
380 F.2d 741, 743-44 (10th Cir. 1967) (citing Preston, 376 U.S. at 367). But see United States v.
Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 15 (1977) ("Once law enforcement officers have reduced . . . personal
property not immediately associated with the person of the arrestee to their exclusive control, ....
a search of that property is no longer an incident of the arrest."), abrogated by California v.
Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (1991); United States v. Schleis, 582 F.2d 1166, 1171-72 (8th Cir. 1978)
(en banc) (holding that police could not rely on the search-incident-to-arrest exception to justify
searching the arrestee's briefcase after the briefcase was within the exclusive control of the police
at the stationhouse).
56. Edwards, 415 U.S. at 805.
57. Id. at 807-08.
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a reasonable extent-take his own privacy out of the realm of
protection from police interest in weapons, means of escape, and
evidence."58
c. Non-Contemporaneous Search
In United States v. Chadwick, the Court decided whether property seized at
the time of arrest may be searched later at law enforcement's headquarters
when the property is under law enforcement's exclusive control.59 The FBI
seized Chadwick's 200-pound trunk during his lawful arrest. 60 The FBI then
took the trunk to the Federal Building in Boston and, while under its
"exclusive control," opened it and discovered marijuana.6 ' The time between
arrest and search was about an hour and a half.62
Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, writing for the Court, stated that the
overarching question under the Fourth Amendment was whether the search
was reasonable. The Court found that the search of the trunk was not
justified as incident to a lawful arrest.64 It acknowledged that a search incident
to arrest is justified if the items were within the "immediate control" of the
arrestee, regardless of "the probability that weapons or destructible evidence
may be involved." 65 However, the Court found that the search did not occur
contemporaneously with the arrest and explained that
[o]nce law enforcement officers have reduced ... personal property
not immediately associated with the person of the arrestee to their
exclusive control, and there is no longer any danger that the arrestee
might gain access to the property to seize a weapon or destroy
58. Id at 808-09 (emphasis added) (quoting United States v. DeLeo, 422 F.2d 487, 493 (1st
Cir. 1970)); see Schleis, 582 F.2d at 1171 ("[A] close reading indicates that the Supreme Court
was only referring to searches of effects still in the defendant's possession at the place of
detention, such as the defendant's clothing.").
59. Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 3. The Court declined to extend the rationales underlying the
automobile exception-preservation of evidence and a lowered expectation of privacy in a
vehicle-to the search-incident-to-arrest exception. Id. at 12-13. Although this Comment does
not consider the automobile exception, further discussion may be found in Carol A. Chase, Cars,
Cops, and Crooks: A Reexamination of Belton and Carroll with an Eye Toward Restoring Fourth
Amendment Privacy Protection to Automobiles, 85 OR. L. REv. 913, 929-41 (2006).
60. Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 4.
61. Id. at 4-5.
62. Id
63. Id. at 9. The Court noted that judicial scrutiny is a more reliable safeguard than the
hurried judgment of police officers. Id A neutral magistrate would be better able to set proper
boundaries and provide better protection and assurance to the individual whose privacy is being
intruded. Id.
64. Id at 14.
65. Id. at 14-15.
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evidence, a search of that property is no longer an incident of the
arrest.66
d An Affirmance of the Dual Rationales Underlying the Search-Incident-
to-A rrest Exception: Officer Safety and Preservation of Evidence
In Thornton v. United States, the Court decided whether an officer may
search a vehicle incident to arrest if the individual was arrested by the officer
that made first contact after the individual had left and was walking away from
the car. Upon arrest, police handcuffed Thornton and placed him in the back
of a police car.68 Then, the police searched his automobile and discovered a
handgun.69 The Court looked to the facts and holding of New York v. Belton70
to decide that the search was constitutional under the search-incident-to-arrest
exception 71 The Court construed the question in the case very narrowly and
considered only whether the search was valid because the officer made first
contact after the arrestee exited the car.72
66. Id. The Court distinguished "searches of possessions within an arrestee's immediate
control" with "searches of the person" because "searches of possessions within an arrestee's
immediate control cannot be justified by any reduced expectations of privacy caused by the
arrest." Id. at 16 n.10.
67. Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 617 (2004). The officer first made contact
with the arrestee while he was in "close proximity, both temporally and spatially." United States
v. Thornton, 325 F.3d 189, 196 (4th Cir. 2003), aff'd, 541 U.S. 615.
68. Thornton, 541 U.S. at 618.
69. Id
70. In New York v. Belton, the Court held that the scope of a search incident to arrest
included the passenger compartment of the arrestee's car and any containers found therein. New
York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 (1981), abrogated by Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710 (2009).
Although the Court stated that the arrestees may not have been able to reach the passenger
compartment upon arrest, it held that the items in the passenger compartment were generally
accessible and thus fulfilled the dual rationales articulated in Chimel. Id. The Court reasoned
that a bright-line rule was necessary to ensure that police officers comply with the Fourth
Amendment as they conduct their day-to-day duties. Id at 458.
71. Thornton, 541 U.S. at 619-21. The Thornton Court noted that (1) the Belton Court
placed no reliance on the location of the arrestee and (2) whether the police touched the arrestee
while he was inside or outside the vehicle makes no difference in determining whether the
vehicle-and by association the containers within the vehicle-are within his reach. Id at 620-
21.
72. Id at 623. The Court stated that requiring officers to make a fact-intensive decision on
whether the contact point was made before, during, or after a person left the vehicle would
frustrate the bright-line rule Belton sought to create. Id.
454 [Vol. 60:445
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Justice Antonin Scalia's concurring opinion was pointed and prophetic.
Justice Scalia sought to answer a much broader question about the
constitutionality of the search. As he saw it, only three reasons could have
justified the search in Thornton, and none of them were persuasive. 74  First,
Justice Scalia dismissed the argument that Thornton might have escaped the
police vehicle and retrieved a weapon or evidence from the car. Second,
Justice Scalia rejected the notion that "since the officer could have conducted
the search at the time of arrest (when the suspect was still near the car), he
should not be penalized for having taken the sensible precaution of securing
the suspect in the squad car first." The infirmity that Justice Scalia saw in
this argument was the assumption that the search must take place regardless of
whether the officer's safety was at risk or evidence may have been lost.77
The final argument that Justice Scalia ultimately rejected was that the
advantages of having a bright-line rule outweigh the few cases where a Belton
search is unreasonable. As Justice Scalia stated, the legitimacy of that
reasoning depends upon "Belton's claim that the passenger compartment is 'in
fact generally, even if not inevitably,' within the suspect's immediate
73. See id at 625-32 (Scalia, J., concurring); see also Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710,
1723-24 (2009) (holding that when an arrestee is handcuffed in the back of a police car, he can
no longer reach his vehicle; thus, Chimel's dual rationales no longer apply, and a search of the
vehicle incident to arrest is not reasonable under the Fourth Amendment). Although Gant
adopted Justice Scalia's view that a broad interpretation of Belton allowing a search without
Chimel's rationales went too far, the Court did not adopt Justice Scalia's view entirely: the Court
retained allowing an officer to search the passenger compartment if the officer's safety is at issue.
Compare Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1721-24 (holding that the search of an automobile incident to arrest
is only justified when Chimel's dual rationales are present or there is reason to believe evidence
of the crime will be found in the vehicle), with id at 1724-25 (Scalia, J., concurring) (advocating
that the Court abandon Chimel as applied to automobile searches and hold that searches incident
to arrest are reasonable "only when the object of the search is evidence of the crime for which the
arrest was made, or of another crime that the officer has probable cause to believe occurred").
74. Thornton, 541 U.S. at 625 (Scalia, J., concurring).
75. Id. at 625-26 (stating that such a theory "calls to mind Judge Goldberg's reference to
the mythical arrestee 'possessed of the skill of Houdini and the strength of Hercules"' (quoting
United States v. Frick, 490 F.2d 666, 673 (5th Cir. 1973) (Goldberg, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part))). Justice Scalia noted that the government was only able to find seven cases
within the previous thirteen years of an arrestee who attacked an officer after being handcuffed.
Id. at 626. Of those cases, Justice Scalia noted that three "retrieved weapons concealed on their
own persons," and three others "seized a weapon from the arresting officer." Id Only one
arrestee escaped from the back of a police car, and he fled into the woods, obtained a weapon
from a house, and attacked the officer while still in handcuffs. Id.
76. Id. at 627.
77. Id.; see id. at 624 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("As Justice Scalia forcefully argues,...
lower court decisions seem now to treat the ability to search a vehicle incident to the arrest of a
recent occupant as a police entitlement rather than as an exception justified by the twin rationales
of Chimel. . . ." (internal citation omitted)).
78. Id. at 627 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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control."79 However, common police practice requires an officer to restrain the
arrestee and secure him in the back of the police car before searching the
vehicle.80  Thus, Justice Scalia found that applying Belton to this case
"stretche[d] [the search-incident-to-arrest exception] beyond its breaking
point,"8' and the wise, honest approach would be to allow Belton searches
whenever "it is reasonable to believe evidence relevant to the crime of arrest
might be found in the vehicle." 82
In Arizona v. Gant, Justice Scalia received part of what he sought: the Court
held that Belton should be read narrowly to justify a search only when an
"arrestee is within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time
of the search or it is reasonable to believe the vehicle contains evidence of the
offense of arrest." 83 The Court rejected a broad reading of Belton based, in
part, on the Court's perception that lower courts were abusing its holding.84
Furthermore, the Court stated that the government "seriously undervalue[d] the
privacy interests at stake."85 What was created as a bright-line rule to guide
police conduct resulted in inconsistent application by police and the courts.86
2. Search Incident to Arrest: A Distinction Between Items that Are Elements
of a Person and a Person's Possessions
Edwards held that a search may be conducted at the police station within a
reasonable time after an arrest so long as the search could have been conducted
79. Id at 627-28 (quoting New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 (1981), abrogated by
Arizona v. Gant, 127 S. Ct. 1710 (2009)).
80. Id Justice Scalia further noted that "[slome courts uphold such searches even when the
squad car carrying the handcuffed arrestee has already left the scene." Id. at 628 (citing United
States v. McLaughlin, 170 F.3d 889, 890-91 (9th Cir. 1999), overruled in party by Gant, 127 S.
Ct. 1710).
81. Id at 625. As one circuit court judge has put it,
[Iln our search for clarity, we have now abandoned our constitutional moorings and
floated to a place where the law approves of purely exploratory searches of vehicles
during which officers with no definite objective or reason for the search are allowed to
rummage around in a car to see what they might find.
McLaughlin, 170 F.3d at 894 (Trott, J., concurring).
82. Thornton, 541 U.S. at 632 (Scalia, J., concurring).
83. Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1723. The Court did not remove officer safety from the equation as
Justice Scalia advocated in Thornton and Gant. See Thornton, 541 U.S. at 632 (Scalia, J.,
concurring); see also Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1725 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("No other Justice,
however, shares my view that application of Chimel in this context should be entirely
abandoned."). The Court's holding that police may search a vehicle for evidence of the crime of
arrest was based on the automobile exception and not the search-incident-to-arrest exception. See
id. at 1719 (majority opinion).
84. Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1718-19. The Court found that taken to its logical conclusion, such
a reading "would ... untether the rule from the justifications underlying the Chimel exception."
Id. at 1719.
85. Id. at 1720.
86. Id at 1720-21. To illustrate the confusion, the Court cited several cases that, despite
similar facts, reached contradictory conclusions. Id. at 1721 n.7.
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at the time of the arrest. However, Chadwick soon limited Edwards's broad
holding to bar searches of possessions once they come into the "exclusive
control" of the police. Lower courts have struggled to reconcile these two
cases but have been consistent on what is considered an element of the person
under Edwards and what is a possession under Chadwick.89 The courts have
been inconsistent, however, when they have tried to classify cellphones; some
courts have held that they are elements of the person that can be searched
within a reasonable time. Other courts have held that they are possessions
only searchable at the moment of arrest.91
a. Containers that Are Elements of the Person May Be Searched Within a
Reasonable Time Following an Arrest
Generally, if a lower court finds that a container is an element of the person,
then it will uphold the search of that container under Edwards as long as the92
search occurred within a reasonable time after it was seized. In United States
v. Passaro, the Ninth Circuit held that the defendant's wallet was an element of
his person. 93 The Ninth Circuit rested its conclusion on Edwards's holding
that a police officer may search an arrestee either at the moment of arrest or at
the place of detention without needing to obtain a search warrant first.94 The
Ninth Circuit distinguished Chadwick's factual situation from the facts
87. See supra Part I.B.1.b.
88. See supra Part LB. I.c.
89. See supra Part I.B.2.
90. See infra Part I.C.
91. See infra Part I.C.
92. See supra Part 1.B.1.b.
93. United States v. Passaro, 624 F.2d 938, 944 (9th Cir. 1980). The Ninth Circuit did not
specify exactly how much time elapsed between the arrest and the subsequent search at the place
of detention, though apparently it was less than twenty-four hours. See id at 943. Police seized
Passaro's wallet "from his person" after he arrived at an initial detention facility and photocopied
a document in the wallet. Id Initially, the Ninth Circuit quoted Robinson:
A police officer's determination as to how and where to search the person of a suspect
whom he has arrested is necessarily a quick ad hoc judgment which the Fourth
Amendment does not require to be broken down in each instance into an analysis of
each step in the search.
Id (quoting United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973)). Robinson further stated that
the dual rationales of Chimel "do[] not depend on what a court may later decide was the
probability in a particular arrest situation that weapons or evidence would in fact be found upon
the person of the suspect." Robinson, 414 U.S. at 235.
94. Passaro, 624 F.2d at 944 (citing United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800, 803 (1974)).
Edwards further stated that "[w]hile the legal arrest of a person should not destroy the privacy of
his premises, it does-for at least a reasonable time and to a reasonable extent-take his own
privacy out of the realm of protection from police interest in weapons, means of escape, and
evidence." Edwards, 415 U.S. at 808-09 (quoting United States v. DeLeo, 422 F.2d 487, 493
(1st Cir. 1970)).
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presented in Passaro.9 5 Because the wallet in Passaro's pocket was an element
of his person, the court applied Edwards and held that the search was
reasonable even though it was conducted after the arrestee was detained.96
In United States v. Rodriguez, the Seventh Circuit concluded that an address
book found on the arrestee's person was an element of his person. 97 Rodriguez
challenged the police search of his wallet and address book as unconstitutional
because it took place at the sheriffs station after he was arrested at his
workplace. The court first cited another case in which it had previously
upheld a search of an arrestee's wallet incident to arrest.99 Further, under
Edwards, the court concluded that the search was permissible because a search
that could have been executed at the scene of arrest may be executed when the
arrestee arrives at the station house.100
Two years later in United States v. Lynch, a lower court analogized the
warrentless search of a pager to previous courts' analyses of wallets and
address books, thereby upholding the search.' 0' The court characterized the
choice of approach as either controlled by Chadwick-which would require a
warrant to search possessions found within an arrestee's immediate control
after an arrest-or controlled by Robinson-which would dispense with the
warrant requirement when the search is of an element found on the person and
95. Passaro, 624 F.2d at 944. The Court asserted that unlike the double-locked footlocker
in Chadwick, which was "clearly separate from the person," the officers discovered the wallet "in
the pocket of Mr. Passaro"; therefore, the court ruled that the wallet was "an element of his
clothing [and thus] his person." Id. As such, Passaro's privacy interests, protected by the Fourth
Amendment, gave way to the police's interests for a reasonable amount of time. Id
96. Id The Ninth Circuit also noted that in Chadwick the "personal effects [were] inside a
double-locked footlocker," which showed the extent to which the arrestee had manifested an
expectation of privacy. Id (quoting United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 11 (1977), abrogated
by California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (1991)).
97. United States v. Rodriguez, 995 F.2d 776, 778 (9th Cir. 1993).
98. Id. at 777. Rodriguez was arrested at his workplace, searched for weapons, and then
transported to the sheriff's station where he was subjected to a more thorough search. Id
99. Id. at 778 (citing United States v. Molinaro, 877 F.2d 1341, 1346-47 (7th Cir. 1989)).
In Molinaro, a DEA agent had spread out the wallet's contents on the trunk of his car while
Molinaro was restrained in the back seat. Molinaro, 877 F.2d at 1346. The court noted that the
Supreme Court had upheld searches incident to arrest in similar cases. Id. at 1346-47.
Consequently, the court upheld the search, which revealed evidence of co-conspirators. Id. at
1347.
100. Rodriguez, 995 F.2d at 778 (citing United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800, 803 (1974)).
101. United States v. Lynch, 908 F. Supp. 284, 288-89 (D.V.I. 1995). Soon after Lynch's
arrest, federal agents seized his pager and searched for phone numbers. Id at 286. Although the
Lynch court reasoned that a pager was an element of the person, the Seventh Circuit reasoned that
a search of a pager was justified under the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine. United States v.
Ortiz, 84 F.3d 977, 984 (7th Cir. 1996). The Seventh Circuit noted that information on a pager is
easily lost and a search is therefore justified by the need to preserve evidence. Id. ("Because of
the finite nature of a pager's electronic memory, incoming pages may destroy currently stored
telephone numbers in a pager's memory. The contents of some pagers also can be destroyed
merely by turning off the power or touching a button.").
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conducted within a reasonable time of the arrest.102 The court reasoned that
the "exclusive control" test of Chadwick no longer applied because of
Belton. 0 3 It held that a "pager was personal property immediately associated
with the person . . . , as distinguished from . . . 'personal property not
immediately associated with the person of the arrestee."' 
1 04
b. Containers that Are Possessions Within an Arrestee's Control May Not
Be Searched Once They Come Under the Exclusive Control of
Law-Enforcement Officers
In United States v. Monclavo-Cruz, the Ninth Circuit held that the search of
a purse an hour after arrest was not a valid search incident to arrest.'os The
court interpreted Edwards narrowly because Chadwick confined the Edwards
holding to searches of the arrestee's clothing conducted at the police station.106
In this vein, the Monclavo-Cruz court limited Edwards to searches of
possessions that are an element of the person or clothing and further held that a
purse does not fit into that category.' 07
102. Lynch, 908 F. Supp. at 287. The court noted that many cases had relied on Robinson to
hold that searches of wallets and address books were permissible as searches incident to arrest.
Id at 288. It also noted that, under Edwards, an arrestee's privacy interest in the personal effect
is destroyed "for at least a reasonable time and to a reasonable extent." Id. (quoting Edwards,
415 U.S. at 808-09).
103. Id. ("The fact that the object is no longer at risk of being accessed by the defendant,
because it is in the exclusive control of the arresting officers, is immaterial." (citing New York v.
Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 462 (1981), abrogated by Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710 (2009))). But
see Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1718-19 (noting that numerous lower courts have read Belton too
broadly).
104. Lynch, 908 F. Supp. at 289. The court noted that a California district court had also
upheld a search of a pager incident to arrest. Id. (citing United States v. Chan, 830 F. Supp. 531,
535-36 (N.D. Cal. 1993)). The Lynch court noted, however, that United States v. Chan had
distinguished Chadwick by reasoning that the search in its case took place only minutes after the
arrest as opposed to the hour and a half in Chadwick. Id (citing Chan, 830 F. Supp. at 535-36).
This may have understated Chan because that court also held that "the pager was the product of a
search of Chan's person." Chan, 830 F. Supp. at 536. It then broadly held that once an object is
validly seized incident to arrest, any reasonable expectation of privacy an arrestee may have in it
is destroyed. Id.
105. United States v. Monclavo-Cruz, 662 F.2d 1285, 1286, 1289-90 (9th Cir. 1981). After
arresting Monclavo-Cruz, the immigration investigator took her back to the immigration office
and conducted a search of her purse in her presence. Id. at 1286. The officer conducted the
search without a warrant because he believed that searching her purse immediately at the place of
arrest would be a security risk. Id The officer recalled that Monclavo-Cruz's purse "was either
in her hand, on her lap, or on the seat of the car at the time of arrest." Id.
106. Id. at 1289-90. The government argued that the court should follow a broad reading of
Edwards: "[S]earches and seizures that could be made on the spot at the time of the arrest may
legally be conducted later when the accused arrives at the place of detention." Id at 1289
(alteration in original) (quoting Edwards, 415 U.S. at 803).
107. Id; see United States v. Ortiz, 84 F.3d 977, 983-84 (7th Cir. 1996) (noting that the
lower court struck down the search of a computerized wristwatch-capable of storing an
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Likewise, in United States v. Schleis, the Eighth Circuit held that a search of
a briefcase after it came under exclusive control of the police was invalid
because the briefcase was not an element of the arrestee's person.' 08 The court
first rejected the government's argument that Chadwick should only apply to
large and less movable objects.109 The government next argued that Edwards
and Chimel would be eviscerated if the court found the search invalid.'" 0 The
court rejected this argument as well because Chadwick itself acknowledged
and affirmed the Edwards and Chimel exceptions." Furthermore, the court
observed that "a close reading [of Edwards] indicate[d] that the Supreme Court
was only referring to searches of effects still in the defendant's possession at
the place of detention."" 2 The court then noted that the test in determining
whether an item within an arrestee's immediate control may be searched
incident to arrest turned on whether the item was within the police officer's
exclusive control.'"3  If it was a possession within the police officer's
immediate control, then it could not be searched without a search warrant at
the stationhouse."14
electronic address book-that took place the day following the seizure because it was not
contemporaneous with the arrest).
108. United States v. Schleis, 582 F.2d 1166, 1171-72 (8th Cir. 1978) (en banc). The
original panel decision held that the search of the wallet, clothing, pill bottle, and briefcase were
all valid. United States v. Schleis, 543 F.2d 59, 61-62 (8th Cir. 1976), vacated, 433 U.S. 905
(1977). The panel decision, however, was vacated and remanded "for further consideration in
light of United States v. Chadwick." Schleis v. United States, 433 U.S. 905, 905 (1977)). Sitting
en banc, the Eighth Circuit held that all of the above searches were valid except for the search of
the briefcase. Schleis, 582 F.2d at 1168.
109. Schleis, 582 F.2d at 1170. The court reasoned that the contents of a briefcase are
entitled to the same protection as those of a footlocker, and Schleis had demonstrated a
reasonable expectation of privacy in the briefcase by locking and maintaining possession of it. Id
The court also noted that numerous other courts had applied Chadwick to items other than
difficult-to-move footlockers, such as suitcases, attachd cases, and even a wallet. Id at 1170 n.3.
110. Id. at il70-71.
Ill. Id at 1171.
112. Id. The court further noted that "[t]his reading of Edwards is strengthened by Chadwick
where the Supreme Court distinguished searches of the person from searches of possessions
within an arrestee's immediate control" and that "Chadwick clearly refrained from extending
Edwards beyond searches of an arrestee's clothing." Id.
113. Id. at 1172. The court further noted in dicta that an item typically will be under the
government's exclusive control at the moment of seizure. Id. The concurrence by former Chief
Judge John R. Gibson took issue with this statement because he believed that such a broad
interpretation "would practically eliminate the search incident to arrest exception to the warrant
requirement." Id. at 1175 (Gibson, C.J., concurring). His intuition would prove correct; the
Supreme Court in Belton invoked the same reasoning in holding that items do not come under the
exclusive control of the police upon initial seizure. New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 461 n.5
(1981), abrogated by Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710 (2009).
114. Schleis, 582 F.2d at 1172.
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C. Courts Are Split over Whether a Cellphone Is an Element of the Person or
a Possession Within the Arrestee's Control
Beginning in 2007, a large number of courts began to consider whether a
cellphone was an element of the person or merely a possession.s15 On January
26, 2007, the Fifth Circuit decided United States v. Finley and held that a
cellphone was an element of the arrestee's person and not a possession within
the arrestee's control."' 6  The court found that Finley had a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the cellphone that had been provided by his
employer.117 The court next considered whether the search-incident-to-arrest
exception justified the warrantless search of the cellphone."1 It concluded that
because the cellphone was discovered on Finley's person during his arrest, it
was an element of his person, and the search was therefore valid." 9
Soon after Finley, two district courts reached the opposite conclusion
regarding cellphone searches.' 20 In United States v. Lasalle, the court held that
115. Compare United States v. Deans, 549 F. Supp. 2d 1085, 1094 (D. Minn. 2008) (holding
that when a cellphone is properly seized incident to arrest, "officers may also search any data
electrohically stored in the device"), United States v. Dennis, Crim. No. 07-008-DLB, 2007 WL
3400500, at *8 (E.D. Ky. Nov. 13, 2007) (holding that even though the defendant lacked the
capacity to destroy the evidence at the time of the search, the search was valid because it was
within his immediate control when he was arrested), and United States v. Cote, No. 03CR271,
2005 WL 1323343, at *6 (N.D. Ill. May 26, 2005) (analogizing cellphones to wallets and address
books "since they would contain similar information," and holding the search of a cellphone valid
even though it took place two and one-half hours after the arrestee was brought to the police
station (emphasis added)), with United States v. James, No. 1:06CR134 CDP, 2008 WL 1925032,
at *9-10, *10 n.4 (E.D. Mo. Apr. 29, 2008) (disagreeing with the magistrate judge that a
cellphone search that took place thirty to forty-five minutes after the defendant's arrest would be
covered by the search-incident-to-arrest exception, but finding that the search was authorized by a
search warrant), and State v. Isaac, No. 101,230, 2009 WL 1858754, at *4-5, *7 (Kan. Ct. App.
June 26, 2009) (holding that the search of a cellphone that took place more than an hour after the
defendant was processed at a jail must be contemporaneous with the arrest because a cellphone is
analogous to a computer).
116. United State v. Finley, 477 F.3d 250, 260 & n.7 (5th Cir. 2007). Finley was arrested
during a traffic stop, and the police obtained a cellphone while searching his person. Id. at 254.
Sometime later during police questioning, one of the officers began searching Finley's cellphone
and discovered incriminating evidence. Id. at 254-55.
117. Idat258-59.
118. Id The Fifth Circuit noted that, under Robinson, a full search of the person incident to a
lawful arrest is ipso facto reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Id Finley was transported to
another person's residence before the search took place, but the court found that this did not alter
the outcome because the police had not completed the arrest. Id. at 260 n.7.
119. Id. at 260 & n.7. The court also distinguished Chadwick because it applies only to items
that are not "immediately associated with the person." Id at 260 n.7 (emphasis omitted) (quoting
United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 15 (1977), abrogated by California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S.
565 (1991)). The court concluded that Edwards, not Chadwick, governed items found on a
person. Id.
120. See United States v. Park, No. CR 05-375SI, 2007 WL 1521573, at *9 (N.D. Cal. May
23, 2007); United States v. Lasalle, Cr. No. 07-00032 SOM, 2007 WL 1390820, at *7 (D. Haw.
May 9, 2007).
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a search of Lasalle's cellphones that occurred while Lasalle was being booked
three hours after his arrest was not a valid search incident to arrest.121 The
court began its analysis by observing that Robinson and Edwards grant police
broad authority to search incident to arrest.122 The court stated, however, that
"pursuant to Monclavo-Cruz, Edwards applie[d] only to Lasalle's person or
elements of Laselle's clothing."l23 The court held that the cellphones were not
part of Lasalle's person, and the government conceded that they were not part
of Lasalle's clothing.1 2 4  Therefore, Edwards did not control the court's
analysis. 25
The court turned to United States v. McLaughlin for the proposition that it
should apply a "flexible standard[] such as 'roughly contemporaneous with the
arrest' and within 'a reasonable time' after obtaining control of the object of
the search."1 26  Using this principle, the court held that the search of the
cellphones was not contemporaneous given the time and distance separating
the arrest and the search.127
United States v. Park also addressed the validity of a warrantless cellphone
search.128 The court began by noting the distinct treatment of "searches of the
person" under Edwards and "searches of possessions within an arrestee's
control" under Chadwick.129 Troubled by the sheer quantity of personal data
that cellphones can hold,130 the court refused to push the bounds of the
121. Lasalle, 2007 WL 1390820, at *7. At the time Lasalle was arrested, two cellphones
were recovered; whether the cellphones were recovered from Laselle's person was unknown. Id.
at *2. Following a search of Laselle's residence, a police officer began searching Laselle's
cellphones while he was being booked without consent or pursuant to a warrant. Id.
122. Id. at *3-4; see supra Part 1.B.1.b.
123. Lasalle, 2007 WL 1390820, at *6 (emphasis added) (internal citation omitted).
124. Id
125. Id.
126. Id. (quoting United States v. McLaughlin, 170 F.3d 889, 892 (9th Cir. 1999) (internal
citation omitted), overruled by Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710 (2009)). But see Gant, 129 S. Ct.
at 1720-21 (citing McLaughlin as evidence that "contemporaneous to arrest" proved to be a
difficult standard to apply).
127. Lasalle, 2007 WL 1390820, at *7. The court stated that the "relevant inquiry" was
whether intervening events had separated the search spatially and temporally from the arrest and
not simply how much time had passed between the two events. Id. at *6-7. The court also stated
that concerns about officer safety could not justify the search because any risk to the officers had
subsided by the time the search occurred. Id. at *7.
128. United States v. Park, No. CR 05-375SI, 2007 WL 1521573, at *1 (N.D. Cal. May 23,
2007). The officers making the arrest seized three cellphones owned by three of the five
arrestees. Id. at *2. The affidavits of the arresting officers were vague as to when and where the
search of the cellphones occurred. Id at *3-5. It was not standard procedure to conduct
inventory searches as to the contents of cellphones, so the search could not be justified as such.
Id. at *2.
129. Id. at *6.
130. Id at *8. The court was also troubled by the government's assertion that it could search
an arrestee's laptop incident to arrest, given the amount of personal and private information that
people store on their laptops. Id. The court found that the level of intrusiveness engaged in by
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search-incident-to-arrest exception beyond Chimel's original justification
absent direction from the Supreme Court or the Ninth Circuit.'3 ' The court
concluded that due to the "quantity and quality of information that can be
stored on a cellular phone," it should be characterized as a possession of the
arrestee and not an element of his person.' 32
Recently, the Supreme Court of Ohio, in State v. Smith, reviewed a case
concerning whether police may search a cellphone incident to arrest. 33 Smith
was indicted on one count of trafficking cocaine after police officers tapped a
phone call between Smith and a woman who claimed that Smith was her
dealer.13 4 During the arrest, police found Smith's cellphone on his person and
seized it.' 35 Although it was unclear exactly when the search took place, the
police accessed the cellphone's call record to verify that the conversation
between Smith and the woman had occurred. 36
The Supreme Court of Ohio reversed the Ohio Court of Appeals's
conclusion that the evidence discovered by searching Smith's cellphone had
not been obtained in violation of Smith's Fourth Amendment rights. 37 First,
the government in searching a laptop or cellphone was far greater than when it searched "the
contents of a lunchbox or other tangible object" because laptops and cellphones can "include
diaries, personal letters, medical information, photos and financial records in one device." Id.
131. Id. at *8-9; see also Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1723-24 (limiting Belton and Thornton to the
original Chimel rationales with the extra exception applicable only to automobiles for reasonable
belief that evidence of the crime will be discovered).
132. Park, 2007 WL 1521573, at *9. The court finished justifying its holding by
distinguishing previous cases that held pagers and older cellphones to be elements of the person.
Id. at *8 n.6 ("In this case, two of the searched phones were T-Mobile Sidekick Is; in addition to
address books, these phones feature e-mail accounts, text messaging, cameras, instant messenging
[sic], Internet capability, and video caller ID. The Court takes judicial notice of these features."
(citing T-Mobile Sidekick@ II, T-MOBILE, http://www.t-mobile.com/shop/phones/detail.
aspx?tp=tb2&device=154e9bca-a74c-4299-99eb-48al 159c922b (last visited Nov. 15, 2010)); see
also SPRINT, supra note 14; VERIZON WIRELESS, supra note 14. The court distinguished the
cases involving searches of pagers because there was no evidence in this case showing the need to
prevent destruction of evidence and because searches of pagers "implicate[] significantly fewer
privacy interests" than do searches of cellphones due to the difference in technology. Park, 2007
WL 1521573, at *9.
133. State v. Smith, 920 N.E.2d 949, 950 (Ohio 2009), reh'g denied, 921 N.E.2d 248 (Ohio),
cert. denied, 79 U.S.L.W. 3016 (U.S. 2010).
134. Id at 950-51.
135. Id at 950.
136. Id
137. Id at 951, 956. The Ohio Court of Appeals held that Finley controlled, and therefore
the search was constitutional. Id. at 950-51. The Court of Appeals first noted the differing
analyses of Finley and Park, but viewed the Finley court as employing superior reasoning. State
v. Smith, No. 07-CA-47, 2008 WL 2861693, at *5-7 (Ohio Ct. App. July 25, 2008), rev'd, 920.
N.E.2d 949 (Ohio 2009), reh'g denied, 921 N.E.2d 248 (Ohio), cert. denied, 79 U.S.L.W. 3016
(U.S. 2010). The Court of Appeals also noted that the trial court suppressed pictures obtained
from Smith's cellphone; thus, the broader privacy concerns of the Park court were not present.
Id at *8. The Court of Appeals approved the trial court's post-search suppression method to limit
the search of Smith's cellphones into permissible areas. Id Such approval implies that a
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the court held that a cell hone was not a "closed container.*. . subject to search
upon a lawful arrest."1 8 According to the court, containers are "physical
objects capable of holding other physical objects."l 3 9 Moreover, the storage
capacity of modem cellphones renders them unlike containers.140 Therefore,
the court found cases analogizing cellphones to containers unpersuasive.
Without the container analogy to guide its analysis, the Supreme Court of
Ohio determined whether the search of Smith's cellphone was justified.
Initially, the court recognized that cellphones are items normally carried on the
person in which a person has a lowered expectation of privacy.141
Furthermore, cellphones contain information similar to that contained in an
address book.142 Although both of these characteristics supported upholding
the search, the court ultimately decided that the vast amounts of other
information that people store in cellphones created a greater expectation of
privacy. 143 Because the police could not claim that the search was necessary
for officer safety or to preserve evidence, the court held that a warrantless
search of a cellphone was unlawful under the Fourth Amendment.144
II. THE BROADENING RIFT IN How COURTS SHOULD TREAT CELLPHONE
SEARCHES FOLLOWING AN ARREST
Three approaches for dealing with cellphone searches have developed. The
first approach, followed by a majority of jurisdictions, treats cellphones as
elements of the person under Edwards and permits a search incident to arrest
within a reasonable time after arrest.145 The second approach, followed by a
cellphone is not just a container, but rather a container holding other electronic containers, some
of which police are permitted to open, and some of which police are not.
Judge Mary E. Donavan dissented, arguing that cellphones should be considered possessions
under Chadwick. Smith, 2008 WL 2861693, at *9-10 (Donovan, J., dissenting). Judge Donovan
first noted that search incident to arrest is a narrow exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant
requirement; as such, the burden of proof is on the government. Id at *9. Judge Donovan also
noted that, although the record is unclear as to where and when the search took place, the police
were certain at trial that they searched the cellphone at the police station several hours after the
arrest. Id. at *10. Judge Donovan found that the state did not meet its burden of proving that the
search was contemporaneous or that exigent circumstances justified the search. Id. at *10-11.
Because Judge Donovan found that the police had gained exclusive control over the cellphone,
the search was no longer contemporaneous. Id. at *10. Judge Donovan agreed with the Park
court that cellphones are more analogous to computers and that the dividing line between the two
is shrinking. Id
138. Smith, 920 N.E.2d at 953-54.
139. Id. at 954 (citing New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 n.4 (1981), abrogated by
Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710 (2009)).
140. Id
141. Id at 955.
142. Id
143. Id
144. Id. at 955-56.
145. See supra Part I.B.2-C.
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minority of jurisdictions, considers cellphones possessions within the arrestee's
control under Chadwick and prohibits warrantless searches after the phone
comes under the police's exclusive control. 146 The final approach, developed
by defense attorneys and civil liberty groups, and recently adopted in Smith,
asserts that because electronic storage devices like cellphones and computers
do not fit within the Supreme Court's definition of "container," privacy
interests and public policy demand application of the warrant clause.147
A. Is a Cellphone More Analogous to a Pager or a Computer?
Both pagers and computers store electronic information. But whether a
cellphone is more like a pager or more like a computer has vastly different
consequences for the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine: courts treat pagers as
elements found on a person and computers as possessions within a person's
immediate control.14 8
There are three principal differences between pagers and computers. First, a
pager is a small device designed to fit on a person's belt or in a pocket,149 and a
laptop computer typically exceeds fifteen inches measured diagonally.150
Second, the difference in storage capacity between the two devices is
enormous. 5 1  Finally, police may be able to recover information from
computers even after data has been deleted, but such recovery is significantly
less likely with respect to the electronic information stored on pagers.152
Unfortunately, cellphones are not readily analogous to either device. On the
one hand, cellphones are small enough to fit on a person's belt or in his
pocket.'53  On the other hand, cellphones are capable of storing enormous
amounts of information. 154  Furthermore, most cellphone memories may be
146. See supra Part I.B.2-C.
147. See supra text accompanying notes 138-44.
148. A laptop is similar to a purse or briefcase, both of which are considered possessions in a
person's control. See supra Part 1.B.2.
149. See United States v. Lynch, 908 F. Supp. 284, 289 n.5 (D.VI. 1995) (noting that the
police seized the pager from the defendant's belt).
150. See, e.g., Everyday Computing Laptop, Tablet, & Netbook PCs, HEWLETT-PACKARD,
www.hp.com (follow "Laptop, Tablet & Netbook PCs" hyperlink; then follow "Everyday
Computing" hyperlink) (last visited Nov. 15, 2010).
151. Compare United States v. Ortiz, 84 F.3d 977, 984 (7th Cir. 1996) (noting the "finite
nature of a pager's electronic memory"), and United States v. Mercado-Nava, 486 F. Supp. 2d
1271, 1278 (D. Kan. 2007) (discussing the limited memory of pagers), with Everyday Computing
Laptop, Tablet, & Netbook PCs (listing laptops with substantial storage capacity).
152. See Mercado-Nava, 486 F. Supp. 2d at 1278; Adam M. Gershowitz, The iPhone Meets
the Fourth Amendment, 56 UCLA L. REV. 27, 37 (2008).
153. See, e.g., United States v. Finley, 477 F.3d 250, 254 (5th Cir. 2007) (noting that the
police discovered Finley's cellphone inside his pocket).
154. See Gershowitz, supra note 152, at 41; supra note 14 and accompanying text.
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recovered even after being "deleted."'155 This makes analogizing a cellphone to
either device difficult. However, as technology advances, there is good
indication that a cellphone is becoming more like a computer and less like a
pager every day.156
B. Should an Electronic Device Like a Cellphone Be Considered a Container?
The Supreme Court of Ohio ruled that any analogy between a modem
cellphone and a container is inapt. Two reasons support this argument.
First, an electronic container does not match the Supreme Court's definition of
a container. Second, cellphones today can contain vast amounts of
information in numerous formats, 159 ranging from simple call logs to more
sophisticated-and potentially more confidential-graphs, webpages, patient
charts, and pictures. 6o
However, the arguments for treating cellphones as containers are three-fold.
First, although the Supreme Court has not considered whether an electronic
device is a container, a plethora of lower courts have allowed the search of an
electronic device incident to a lawful arrest.161 Second, a cellphone contains
155. See Hilary Hylton, What Your Cell Knows About You, TIME, Aug. 15, 2007, available
at http://www.time.com/time/health/article/0,8599,1653267,00.html (discussing data recovery);
see also How to Recover Deleted Text Messages from Mobile Phone-Retrieve Accidentally
Deleted Text Messages, Contact Numbers and Other Data on Sim Card, SQUIDOO (Sept. 9, 2010,
7:45 PM), http://www.squidoo.com/recoverdeletedtextmessages. Not only can this information
usually be recovered from a cellphone, but the cost of recovering it can be relatively inexpensive.
Id.
156. See United States v. Park, No. CR 05-375SI, 2007 WL 1521573, at *8 (N.D. Cal. May
23, 2007); State v. Smith, No. 07-CA-47, 2008 WL 2861693, at *10 (Ohio Ct. App. July 25,
2008), rev'd, 920. N.E.2d 949 (Ohio 2009), reh'g denied, 921 N.E.2d 248 (Ohio), cert. denied, 79
U.S.L.W. 3016 (U.S. 2010).
157. See supra text accompanying notes 138-40.
158. New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 n.4 (1981) (defining a container as "any object
capable of holding another object"), abrogated by Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710 (2009); see
also MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 269 (11th ed. 2003) (defining "container"
as "a receptacle (as a box or jar) for holding goods"). None of the searches that the Supreme
Court has considered concerning the search-incident-to-arrest exception included electronic
devices. See, e.g., Belton, 453 U.S. at 456 (search of coat pocket); United States v. Chadwick,
433 U.S. 1, 15 (1977) (search of footlocker), abrogated by California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565
(1991); United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800, 801 (1974) (search of clothing); United States v.
Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 223 (1973) (search of cigarette pack).
159. See Bruce Schneier, Recovering Data from Cellphones, SCHNEIER ON SECURITY (Sept.
5, 2006, 9:38AM), http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2006/09/recovering data.html; supra
note 14.
160. See Park, 2007 WL 1521573, at *8 (discussing the personal nature of information on
cellphones, like text messages, photographs, and e-mails). Furthermore, this technology is in the
hands of the vast majority of Americans today, and more sophisticated cellphones such as
smartphones are steadily increasing in market share. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
161. See, e.g., United States v. Ortiz, 84 F.3d 977, 984 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that the
search of a pager is a valid search incident to arrest); United States v. Mercado-Nava, 486 F.
Supp. 2d 1271, 1278-79 (D. Kan. 2007) (upholding the search of a cellphone to prevent the
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information analogous to what is found in other objects subject to the container
analysis.' 62  Finally, even if cellphones are not considered containers, the
rationale that permits container searches-preservation of evidence-applies to
cellphones.16 3
C. Should Cellphones Be Treated as a Possession Within a Person's Control
or as an Element of the Person?
Whether cellphones are treated as possessions under Chadwick or as
elements of the person under Edwards is tantamount to deciding if a
warrantless search conducted after the phone comes under the exclusive
control of the police is constitutional. 1 Proponents assert numerous
arguments for treating a cellphone as a possession within a person's immediate
control rather than as an element of the person. First, police are not entitled to
search items incident to arrest; rather, they are allowed to conduct a limited
search pursuant to a narrow exception to the warrant requirement.165 Second,
the storage capacity of items normally considered to be elements of the person,
such as wallets and address books, is very limited.166 Conversely, items that
have a larger storage capacity, like purses and brief cases, are deemed to be
destruction of evidence); United States v. Parada, 289 F. Supp. 2d 1291, 1303-04 (D. Kan. 2003)
(upholding the search of a cellphone incident to arrest in order to preserve evidence); United
States v. Chan, 830 F. Supp. 531, 534 (N.D. Cal. 1993) (analogizing the search of a pager to the
search of a container). Furthermore, simply because the amount of information within the search
may be great is not sufficient to justify eliminating a search entirely. See Belton, 453 U.S. at 455
(holding that a search incident to arrest in a vehicle may include the entire passenger
compartment and any containers therein); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969)
(holding that a search incident to arrest extends to the area within the arrestee's "immediate
control," which may include the entire room where the arrest occurred and to containers within
that room).
162. A cellphone contains information similar to a physical address book. United States v.
Cote, No. 03CR271, 2005 WL 1323343, at *6 (N.D. Ill. May 26, 2005). A photograph on a
cellphone is analogous to a physical picture, and a cellphone's calendar is analogous to a physical
calendar. As such, it follows that a cellphone is simply a large container, but a container
nonetheless. See Park, 2007 WL 1521573, at *8-10 (noting that a cellphone can store large
amounts of information, and providing protection for the phone at the police station but not, by
omission, at the scene of arrest).
163. See State v. Smith, 920 N.E.2d 949, 956 (Ohio 2009) (holding that a warrantless search
of a cellphone is unconstitutional unless it is performed to preserve evidence or for officer safety),
reh'g denied, 921 N.E.2d 248 (Ohio), cert. denied, 79 U.S.L.W. 3016 (U.S. 2010).
164. See supra Part 1.B.2.
165. See Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 627 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring); see
also Chimel, 395 U.S. at 762 (stating that a search "must be strictly tied to and justified by the
circumstances which rendered its initiation permissible" (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19
(1968) (internal quotation marks omitted))).
166. Cf Chan, 830 F. Supp. at 535-36 (holding that a pager is an element of the person);
United States v. Lynch, 908 F. Supp. 284, 289 (D.V.I. 1995) (noting that pagers, address books,
and wallets are elements of the person).
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possessions. It follows, then, that a cellphone's vast storage capacity
requires that it also be treated as a possession within a person's control.
On the other side, advocates who argue that a cellphone should be treated as
an element of the person advance three points. First, a cellphone is small and
often it appears on a person's belt or in a person's pocket-just like a wallet,
address book, or pager-which suggests that it is an element of the person.,ss
Second, although modem cellphones may contain vast amounts of information,
the cellphones typically seized by police tend to be cheaper and less
sophisticated.169  Finally, trial courts can correct any police overreaching in
suppression hearings. 70
However, proponents of the theory that a cellphone is a possession rather
than an element of the person articulate numerous counterarguments. Initially,
linking the lawfulness of a search to where a cellphone is located creates a
fact-intensive question that eviscerates the bright-line rule favored by the
Supreme Court.' 7 1 Moreover, even cheap and less-sophisticated cellphones
have the potential to store large amounts of information, and police still seize
phones that are not considered cheap or less-sophisticated.172 In addition, the
Supreme Court has reaffirmed its commitment to limiting the exception to
those situations where Chimel's dual rationales exist.173
167. See, e.g., United States v. Monclavo-Cruz, 662 F.2d 1285, 1289-90 (9th Cir. 1981)
(holding that a purse is a possession and not an element of the person); United States v. Schleis,
582 F.2d 1166, 1170-72 (8th Cir. 1978) (en banc) (holding that a briefcase is a possession within
a person's control and not an element of the person; therefore, any search requires a warrant once
the briefcase comes under the exclusive control of the police).
168. See United States v. Finley, 477 F.3d 250, 254 (5th Cir. 2007) (noting that police
discovered a cellphone in Finley's pocket after searching his person); United States v. Wall, No.
08-60016-CR, 2008 WL 5381412, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 22, 2008) (observing that a search of the
arrestee's person yielded two cellphones); supra Part 1.B.2.a. Conversely, larger items like
purses, briefcases, and footlockers are considered possessions. See United States v. Chadwick,
433 U.S. 1, 9 (1977), abrogated by California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (1991); Monclavo-Cruz,
662 F.2d at 1289-90; Schleis, 582 F.2d at 1172.
169. See Oral Argument at 05:47, State v. Smith, 920 N.E.2d 949 (Ohio 2009) (No. 2008-
1781), available at http://www.ohiochannel.org/MediaLibrary/Media.aspx?fileld=122113 (noting
that drug dealers typically use unsophisticated cellphones in furtherance of their crimes). Thus,
the concern that vast amounts of private information will fall into the police's zealous hands is
not the case.
170. See Merit Brief of Amicus Curiae Ohio Prosecuting Attorneys Ass'n on Behalf of
Appellee, State of Ohio at 6-7, State v. Smith, 920 N.E.2d 949 (Ohio 2009) (No. 2008-1781).
171. See Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 623 (2004) (noting that an inquiry into
where the defendant was located at the time the police made contact with him created a fact-
intensive inquiry that frustrated Belton's bright-line rule). But see Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct.
1710, 1720-21 (2009) (refuting the myth of Belton's bright-line rule).
172. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
173. Monclavo-Cruz, 662 F.2d at 1289-90; United States v. Park, No. CR 05-375SI, 2007
WL 1521573, at *8 (N.D. Cal. May 23, 2007); see supra Part 1.B.2.b-C. Edwards should be read
narrowly to avoid the exception swallowing the rule. See Chimel, 395 U.S. at 762 (noting that
searches incident to arrest should be "strictly tied to and justified by the circumstances which
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III. SUPREME COURT CASE LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY: CELLPHONES SHOULD
BE TREATED AS POSSESSIONS AND A NEW RULE GOVERNING ELECTRONIC
CONTAINERS SHOULD NOT BE CRAFTED
A. Supreme Court Case Law Demonstrates that Cellphones Are Possessions
Within an Arrestee's Control
1. Cellphones Should Be Considered Containers by the Courts
At its core, a container holds something. In this vein, a cellphone is a
container in two respects. First, a cellphone can physically hold objects, for
example, in a hidden compartment. 174  Second, and most -Pertinent to this
Comment, a cellphone contains electronic information' that can be
reproduced in physical form. Therefore, a cellphone is simply a different
type of container-one that contains information in an electronic format. 177
The storage capacity of a cellphone is similar to the storage capacity of a
briefcase, a purse, a vehicle, or a room in a house, each of which are
considered containers that may be searched contemporaneously incident to an
arrest.' 78 Therefore, the storage capacity of cellphones does not warrant their
exclusion under the search-incident-to-atrest exception.
More importantly, it simply does not matter whether cellphones are
considered containers. The driving force behind a search incident to arrest is
not whether the item is a container but rather whether either of Chimel's dual
rendered its initiation permissible" (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Gant, 129 S. Ct.
at 1724 (rejecting the state's argument that, based on precedent, a police officer is justified in
searching a vehicle incident to arrest regardless of whether officer safety or preservation of
evidence is implicated).
Reading Gant as limiting searches incident to arrest to those situations when the dual
rationales are present would not overrule Edwards because it can hardly be said that the police
had exclusive control over the clothing that Edwards was still wearing. See supra Part I.B. I.b. A
search under Edwards, taking place long after an arrestee has been separated from the object, may
certainly present a situation where Chimel's rationales are no longer present. See Park, 2007 WL
1521573, at *8.
174. See Jesus Diaz Cellphone's Secret Compartment Stores Bluetooth Headset, Drugs,
GlZMODO, http://gizmodo.com/326570/cellphones-secret-com-artment-stores-bluetooth-headset-
drugs (last visited Nov. 15, 2010) (showcasing a phone with a secret compartment); see also
Cellphone Gun Video, STRATEGY PAGE (May 4, 2006), http://www.strategypage.com/
militaryphotos/cell_phone gunl.aspx (discussing guns used by criminals that look like
cellphones); Cellphone Stun Gun, TBO-TECH, http://www.tbotech.com/cellphonestungun.htm
(last visited Nov. 15, 2010) (selling stun guns disguised as cellphones).
175. United States v. Fenley, 477 F.3d 250, 259-60 (5th Cir. 2007) (finding a cellphone to be
most analogous to a container); United States v. Ortiz, 84 F.3d 977, 984 (7th Cir. 1996)
(reasoning that a pager could be a container of electronic information).
176. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
177. Arguments that a cellphone does not fit within the Supreme Court's definition of a
"container" are unpersuasive and, therefore, no new rule should be crafted prohibiting any
warrantless search of a cellphone.
178. See supra Part lB.
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rationales-officer safety or preservation of evidence-is present. 179 If one of
the rationales is present, then a warrant is not a prerequisite to a search. 80 If
neither rationale is present, then further analysis is required concerning
whether the search is a narrow Robinson search of the person at the time of
arrest or whether another exception to the warrant requirement applies.' 8'
2. Cellphones Should Be Considered Possessions Within an Arrestee's
Control
a. Cellphones Are More Analogous to Computers than Pagers and
Should Be Treated as Possessions Within an Arrestee's Control
Under current case law, a laptop computer is considered a possession to be
protected from warrantless searches once it comes under the exclusive control
of the police.' 82 Conversely, a pager is considered an element of the person
subject to search at a reasonable time after arrest. It is not the amount of
information that cellphones can store that warrants greater protection, but the
quality of information that warrants greater protection.' 84 Cellphones contain
information ranging from medical records to embarrassing photographs to
business secrets, which can raise serious privacy concerns. Given the
capabilities of cellphones, the potential for discovering confidential
information on a cellphone is greater than the potential of finding that kind of
information on a pager,186  The distinction between the capabilities of
cellphones and pagers will only grow as technology improves to meet market
demands. 87
The similarity in size and shape between cellphones and pagers hardly
makes them analogous for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. Moreover,
the size difference between cellphones and laptop computers is diminishing
179. See supra Part I.B.1.
180. See supra Part I.B. 1.
181. See supra Part 1.A-B.1.
182. See supra Part I.B.2.b.
183. See supra Part I.B.2.a.
184. See Schneier, supra note 159.
185. See id.
186. See United States v. Ortiz, 84 F.3d 977, 984 (7th Cir. 1996); United States v. Park, No.
CR 05-375SI, 2007 WL 1521573, at *9 (N.D. Cal. May 23, 2007).
187. See State v. Smith, 920 N.E.2d 949, 954 (Ohio 2009) (noting the disparity between
modern cellphones and the cellphones of a decade ago), reh'g denied, 921 N.E.2d 248 (Ohio),
cert. denied, 79 U.S.L.W. 3016 (U.S. 2010); see also Park, 2007 WL 1521573, at *8 (same);
supra notes 14-15.
188. See supra Part H.A.
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every year.189 For instance, laptop computers today can be as small as ten
inches measured diagonally and could easily fit inside ofa purse.19 0
Indeed, cellphones are becoming more like computers. They utilize web
browsers and applications mirroring those found on computers.'91 Because
cellphones store information similar to computers and in similarly vast
quantities,192 they should be considered possessions like computers.
b. Case Law Supports Treating Cellphones as Possessions Within an
Arrestee's Immediate Control
Three reasons demonstrate why current Supreme Court case law prohibits a
broad reading of Edwards and why cellphones should be protected as
possessions under Chadwick. First, a search incident to arrest is a narrow
exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement and must be tied to
its justifications.' 93 As a result, courts should not uphold searches executed
outside of Chimel's dual rationales.' 94 Once a cellphone is in the exclusive
control of the police, the evidence that may be found within is safely isolated
from the arrestee, eliminating the need for the immediate search.195
Second, the lack of specificity as to what constitutes a reasonable amount of
time between the arrest and the search clashes with the bright-line rule that the
Supreme Court has endeavored to construct.196 Edwards's rationale was based
on case law that allowed an initial search at the police station.197 It was not an
invitation for the police to conduct searches at their convenience without any
consideration of obtaining a search warrant.
Third, the fact that the police could have conducted a search at one point
does not imply that they should be permitted to conduct a search at a later
point. To paraphrase Justice Scalia in Thornton, searches incident to arrest are
the exception to the rule, not a government entitlement; if sensible police
189. See Mini Laptop, Tablet, & Netbook PCs, HEWLETT PACKARD, www.hp.com (follow
"Laptop, Tablet & Netbook PCs" hyperlink; then follow "Mini" hyperlink) (last visited Oct. 12,
2010) (showing computers as small as ten inches measured diagonally).
190. See id.
191. See SPRINT, supra note 14 (demonstrating features available on cellphones that are
similar to those available on computers); VERIZON WIRELESS, supra note 14 (same).
192. See supra Part lI.A.
193. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-63 (1969).
194. See Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 1723-24 (2009) (holding that when Chimel's dual
rationales no longer apply, a search incident to arrest is not reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment).
195. Merit Brief of Amicus Curiae American Civil Liberties Union of Ohio Foundation, Inc.,
in Support of Appellant, Antwaun Smith at 7-8, State v. Smith, 920 N.E.2d 949 (Ohio 2009) (No.
2008-1781).
196. See supra Part I.B.1.b.
197. United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800, 803-04 (1974) (holding that searching an
arrestee's clothes after waiting to provide him with substitute clothing was reasonable).
198. See id at 808-09; see also supra Part I.B.I.d.
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procedures require an officer to separate an arrestee from his possessions-and
thus eliminate the rationales underlying the exception-then police should
separate the arrestee from his possessions and not conduct the search.199
Because Supreme Court case law reveals that a cellphone is a possession
within an arrestee's control, warrantless searches should be prohibited once
police gain exclusive control of a cellphone.
B. Public Policy Demands that Cellphones Be Treated as Possessions Within
an Arrestee's Control
In addition to Supreme Court case law, public policy supports treating a
cellphone as a possession within an arrestee's immediate control. First, a test
based on the location of a cellphone-whether found in the arrestee's pocket,
on the arrestee's belt, in the arrestee's lap, on the next seat, in the glove
compartment, or elsewhere-creates a fact-intensive inquiry that frustrates the
Court's creation of bright-line rules.200 Such rules are in place both to guide
police and to provide citizens notice as to the extent of their rights.201
Second, treating cellphones as possessions under Chadwick best
accommodates current and future technology. Cellphone technology is rapidly
changing and young consumers are demanding increasingly more features such
202
that the line between cellphones and computers is quickly vanishing. In
such a rapidly changing environment, neutral magistrates are in the best
position to protect the legitimate expectations of privacy associated with new
technology.203
Third, obtaining a search warrant prior to the search of a cellphone does not
present a problem to police enforcement. While some information may be
remotely alterable, the majority of information-such as call logs, text
messages, calendars, and address-book information-may be preserved
without any credible danger of destruction.204 Indeed, most information, even
when "deleted" by a criminal, can be recovered through forensics in the same
way as information found on a computer's hard drive.205 Once police gain
exclusive control of a cellphone, there is little a criminal can do remotely that
will endanger the evidence physically stored on the cellphone's memory.
199. Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 627 (2004) (Scalia, J. concurring).
200. See supra Parts LB., I.C.
201. New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 459-60 (1981), abrogated by Arizona v. Gant, 129
S. Ct. 1710 (2009).
202. See supra notes 14-15.
203. See State v. Smith, 920 N.E.2d 949, 955 (Ohio 2009) (stating that one has a higher
expectation of privacy in a cellphone because of the amount and quality of the information it can
hold), reh'g denied, 921 N.E.2d 248 (Ohio), cert. denied, 79 U.S.L.W. 3016 (U.S. 2010); see also
United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 9 (1976) (discussing the role of magistrates), abrogated
by Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710.
204. See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
205. See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
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Moreover, some cellphone information is backed up on a company server-
like that utilized in Sidekick's cloud memory-so this information could be
physically recovered from the server's hard drive.206
Finally, assuming arguendo that there was a credible risk of remote
destruction of evidence, then the search of a cellphone may be justified under
the exigent-circumstances exception to the Fourth Amendment. 7 As a result,
in such circumstances, the search-incident-to-arrest exception would be
unnecessary.
IV. CONCLUSION
Technology is changing rapidly. New devices defy the rationales for old
rules, demanding changes in the law. Such is the case with cellphones. Lower
courts, without direct guidance from the Supreme Court, have crafted rules for
cellphone searches based on interpretations and analogies from existing law.
Cellphones, however, do not fit into existing categories. The information
stored in cellphones can be vast, and today's phones can perform functions
identical to modem computers. Although some lower courts have been quick
to recognize these facts, many have not. This has created a split in the circuit
courts that should be settled in favor of treating cellphones as possessions
under Chadwick. Such a conclusion is supported by Chimel's dual rationales,
by current Supreme Court case law, and by public policy. A search of a
cellphone incident to arrest must therefore be prohibited once the cellphone
comes under the exclusive control of the police.
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